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ASYLUM RIGHTS AND WRONGS: WHAT THE 
PROPOSED REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT WILL 
DO AND WHAT MORE WILL NEED TO BE DONE 
Michele R. Pistone∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) added major new restrictions to U.S. asylum law.  Several 
other laws passed in the wake of 9/11 produced additional restrictions.  
Various proposals to modify or even eliminate the changes made by IIRI-
RA and the post-9/11 laws have been introduced over the years; the Refu-
gee Protection Act of 2010 (RPA) is the most prominent recent example of 
these efforts.  As this Article details, the RPA has much to commend within 
it, especially its proposed elimination of the one year deadline for asylum 
applications that was originally imposed by IIRIRA. 
The most pressing problem not substantively addressed by the RPA con-
cerns the expansion of expedited removal, a central innovation of IIRIRA.  
Expedited removal authorizes Customs and Border Patrol officers to appre-
hend and deport persons without appropriate travel documents and to bar 
them from reentry for five years.  For persons caught up in the expedited 
removal process, deportation typically occurs less than forty-eight hours 
after arrival at the U.S. border.  The process is able to work so quickly be-
cause the deportation decision typically is made by a front-line border pa-
trol worker and his or her supervisor, with the possibility of judicial review 
either completely barred or extremely limited, depending on the circums-
tances. 
Although various government studies, as well as reports by other groups, 
have shown that expedited removal results in many improper deportations, 
the process nonetheless has been expanded step-by-step in recent years 
 
∗ Michele R. Pistone is a Professor of Law at Villanova University School of Law, where 
she directs the Clinic for Asylum, Refugee and Emigrant Services (CARES).  I am grateful 
to my husband, John Hoeffner, for his invaluable insights and unending support.  Also, 
thanks to my children, Julia and Luke, who were flexible and considerate of the time I 
pulled away from them to work on this Article; when it was done, my daughter declared our 
home “an article free zone.”  © Michele Pistone 2010. 
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beyond its original limitation to U.S. ports of entry, and now applies to all 
locations within 100 miles of a U.S. border (expansively defined to include 
all international waters).  This Article argues that the RPA’s failure to cur-
tail this expansion is a significant and unwelcome omission; indeed, the 
most recent expansions have greatly increased the risk of deporting U.S. 
citizens and legal permanent residents.  The risk of improper deportation is 
not likely to be appreciably lessened by the RPA’s authorization of one ad-
ditional government study of expedited removal.  As the Article points out, 
while prior studies with a similar charge and duration have revealed much 
wrongdoing, they also have been mainly ignored by immigration authori-
ties.  However, the inadequacy of past studies to bring about concrete 
reform is in no small part due to limitations placed upon them by Congress 
or by immigration administrators.  The Article asserts that, in order to 
overcome the bureaucratic biases of the Customs and Border Patrol and to 
ensure the proper implementation of the law, these limitations must be re-
vised or eliminated.  The Article accordingly concludes with a number of 
specific recommendations for enabling future studies to achieve the dual 
objectives of shedding light and bringing about reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International law establishing the rights of refugees derives from the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.1  
Nations signing onto these treaties promise to adhere to the policy of non-
refoulement, a duty not to return refugees to countries in which they fear 
persecution.  The United States agreed to be bound by the 1951 Convention 
 
 1. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
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and its Protocol in 1968.2  The Refugee Act of 1980 codified the treaty ob-
ligations and established a system for adjudicating claims for asylum in the 
United States.3  Under the Refugee Act of 1980, a refugee is eligible for 
asylum if he or she can establish that he or she is “unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of [his or her] country [of natio-
nality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion.”4 
Criticism of the system established in 1980 gained momentum through-
out the 1980s and early 1990s.  Detractors of the asylum process argued 
that its large backlogs and long delays had become a magnet for illegiti-
mate applicants intent on using the system simply to obtain work authoriza-
tion and remain in the country for years pending adjudication of fraudulent 
applications in immigration court at which they had no intention of ever 
appearing.5  Others linked abuse of the asylum system to terrorists, includ-
ing participants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.6 
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA)7 was enacted in response to concerns that the asylum system 
was being abused by fraudulent applicants.  IIRIRA attempted to address 
this problem by imposing procedural hurdles on refugees seeking asylum in 
the United States.  New provisions included a process of “expedited re-
moval,”8 a mandate for pre-hearing detention of asylum seekers identified 
through expedited removal,9 and a one year filing deadline on all asylum 
applications.10  All of these intended solutions have endangered legitimate 
asylum seekers. 
The asylum system again came under attack after 9/11.  The anti-
terrorism legislation that was enacted into law in the aftermath of 9/11, in 
 
 2. The Protocol provides that, by ratifying it, all signatory nations are also bound by 
Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
supra note 1, 19 U.S.T at 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267-68 art. I (1). 
 3. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.  Prior to the implementation 
of the Refugee Act of 1980, refugees were admitted to the United States on an ad hoc basis. 
 4. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 5. Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Laws: Undermining an American Ideal 6-8 
(CATO, Policy Analysis No. 299, 1998). 
 6. 60 Minutes (CBS News television broadcast Jan. 14, 1993). 
 7. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 100 Stat. 3009 (codified at various sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 8. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii) 
(2006). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
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particular the PATRIOT Act11 and the REAL ID Act,12 imposed additional 
substantive and procedural hurdles on asylum seekers that further eroded 
asylum protection. 
The proposed Refugee Protection Act (RPA),13 recently introduced by 
Senators Leahy, Levin, Durbin, Akaka, and Burris, addresses some of the 
problems created by IIRIRA and the PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts.  Un-
fortunately, many problems will remain even upon passage of the RPA.  
This Article outlines the changes made by IIRIRA and post-9/11 legisla-
tion, discusses and assesses the likely effectiveness of the main provisions 
of the RPA should it be passed by Congress, and makes several additional 
suggestions for future legislation.  In particular, my additional suggestions 
focus on expedited removal, with my primary recommendations calling for 
a scaling back of the geographic range of expedited removal and an ex-
panded external examination of the process, significantly beyond the more 
limited examination contemplated by the RPA. 
I.  ASYLUM PRE- AND POST-IIRIRA 
Asylum claims are assessed in two different procedural contexts—
affirmative and defensive.  Affirmative application procedures apply when 
the applicant has entered the United States and applies affirmatively for 
asylum with the Asylum Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(CIS) before removal proceedings are initiated against him or her.  For ex-
ample, a person may be admitted to the United States under a student or a 
visitor visa and then apply for asylum.  Affirmative application procedures 
would apply in these cases, even if the particular visa had expired at the 
time of application.  Indeed, even those who enter the country without in-
spection and who are present in the United States without authorization are 
eligible to apply affirmatively for asylum.  All of these persons, if they ap-
ply affirmatively for asylum, are interviewed by a specially trained asylum 
officer in a non-adversarial interview.  The officer can either grant asylum 
or refer the case to removal proceedings in immigration court.14 
 
 11. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (PATRIOT Act); 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
 12. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Ter-
ror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302-23 (2005) (REAL 
ID Act). 
 13. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess.). 
 14. A third option, to deny the case, is reserved for applicants in lawful status whose 
applications for asylum are not granted after review by the Asylum Office. 
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Suppose, however, that the student or visitor visa had expired and the 
student or visitor was then apprehended by immigration officers and placed 
into removal proceedings before an application for asylum had been filed.  
Or that an individual who entered without inspection was later arrested or 
otherwise identified by immigration officers.  In these cases, defensive ap-
plication procedures would apply with the asylum claim being considered 
for the first time, essentially as an affirmative defense to removal, in an ad-
versarial hearing before an immigration judge in which a trial attorney from 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) opposes the claim.15  If the 
applicant receives an unfavorable decision, the judge’s decision is subject 
first to administrative review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)16 
and then to judicial review in the federal circuit court system.17 
In the 1990s, claims that both types of applications were being widely 
abused began to resonate politically.  Abuse of the affirmative application 
process would occur when, as sometimes happened, weak or fraudulent 
claims would be filed solely to gain the work authorization that, at the time, 
was routinely granted upon the filing of an application for asylum.  Be-
cause the adjudication process was severely backlogged, the work authori-
zation benefit of filing a frivolous claim could last for years. 
Moreover, when an affirmative applicant’s asylum claim was denied by 
an asylum officer, and the case was referred to an immigration judge for 
deportation, the cases could languish in court for years before a final order 
of deportation was issued.  Until that final order, the work authorization 
benefit would remain.  Finally, abuse of the process could be continued 
simply by failing to appear for one’s removal hearing. 
Absconding was of particular concern with regard to individuals who ar-
rived at airports and seaports without properly issued visas or passports.  In 
the 1980s and early 1990s, even these individuals were usually released in-
to the general public after being given notices telling them to appear in 
immigration court for a removal hearing.18  Rates of absconding were high, 
particularly among those without valid claims for asylum, and the likelih-
ood that those who absconded would be detected was minimal.19  To nota-
ble political effect, detractors of the asylum system claimed on national tel-
evision that “every single person on the planet Earth, if he gets into this 
 
 15. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). 
 16. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2010). 
 17. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
 18. Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: A Proposal for Ending the 
Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197, 226 (1999). 
 19. Id.; see also Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029 n.11 (5th Cir. Unit 
B 1982). 
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country, can stay indefinitely by saying two magic words: political asy-
lum.”20 
With Congress motivated by these concerns, IIRIRA—“the harshest, 
most procrustean immigration control measure in [the twentieth] cen-
tury”21—changed the system in several important respects.  The incentive 
to file a frivolous asylum claim was lessened by limiting the availability of 
work authorization; post-IIRIRA, such authorization is available only after 
an application for asylum is pending before an asylum officer or immigra-
tion court without resolution for more than 180 days (which deadline is 
tolled for any delays caused by the applicant).22  And a one year filing 
deadline was imposed on all applications for asylum, whether affirmative 
or defensive.23  Thus, under current law, asylum is barred unless the appli-
cant can prove that the application was filed within one year of the appli-
cant’s last arrival in the United States, or that one of the two exceptions to 
the one year deadline applies.24 
IIRIRA’s biggest change concerned the treatment of persons appre-
hended, most commonly at a designated port of entry, without proper travel 
documents.  Previously, such persons would be placed into exclusion pro-
ceedings before an immigration judge, during which they could file defen-
sive asylum applications, just as the student discussed above could.25  Un-
favorable decisions by an asylum officer would similarly be subject to 
administrative and judicial review.26  Further, while waiting for their re-
moval hearing, persons apprehended without proper travel documents 
would often be free from detention. 
In order to lessen the backlog of removal claims and to lessen the incen-
tive for coming to the United States without appropriate travel documents, 
IIRIRA introduced a system called expedited removal.27  Expedited remov-
al was designed to “stymie unauthorized migration by restricting the hear-
 
 20. 60 Minutes, supra note 6. 
 21. Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and 
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 371 (1999). 
 22. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2004). 
 23. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 24. The one year deadline is extended when extraordinary or changed circumstances 
excuse the delay. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4) (2010). 
 25. Pre-IIRIRA, exclusion procedures governed the removal of individuals who had not 
entered the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226.  Deportation proceedings governed the removal 
of individuals who had crossed the border into the United States. See id. § 1252b. 
 26. Id. § 1105a (referring to judicial review of exclusion and deportation orders; IIRIRA 
consolidated exclusion and deportation proceedings into removal proceedings). 
 27. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 100 Stat. 3009 (expedited removal codified at Immigration and Nationality Act § 
235, 8 U.S.C. § 1125). 
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ing, review, and appeal process for aliens arriving without proper docu-
ments at ports of entry.”28 
At ports of entry, the expedited removal process works as follows.  Per-
sons seeking admission to the United States at border crossings, airports 
and seaports, must pass through an inspections process administered by 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a part of the Department of Homel-
and Security (DHS) and, along with ICE and CIS, one of the successor 
agencies to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).29  Every-
one—citizens and non-citizens alike—who has traveled to the United 
States has experienced the first part of this process, i.e., the primary inter-
view.  At the primary interview, CBP officers inspect travel and identity 
documents, and question non-citizens about their travel purposes and inten-
tions.  For approximately ninety-seven percent of the persons trying to gain 
admission to the United States through official entry points, the primary in-
terview will be a short and final hurdle to entry.30 
The remaining three percent will be sent to a secondary inspection area 
for a secondary interview.31  For the majority of this smaller group, sec-
ondary inspections will closely resemble the primary interview; additional 
scrutiny is mainly provided by processing the applicant’s name through 
various computer databases.  Whether because the electronic security check 
yielded adverse information, or for some other reason, a person subject to 
secondary inspection will, about ten percent of the time, be selected for a 
substantially more probing interview.32 
 
 28. ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33109, IMMI-
GRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS, at CRS-3 (2005). 
 29. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 both established the Department of Homeland 
Security and, as of March 2003, abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 30. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 1 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EX-
PEDITED REMOVAL: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 32 (2005) [hereinafter USCIRF RE-
PORT, vol. 1] (reporting 332 million primary inspections in 2001, and 265 million in 2003); 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-176, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE THE 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCESS 20 (2000) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES EXIST] (noting 28.3 
million primary inspections per month from April 1, 1997 to September 30, 1999). 
 31. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EX-
PEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT REPORTS 6 (2005) [hereinafter USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2] (“[T]he 
number of aliens sent to Secondary Inspection per year approximate 10 million, and 90 per-
cent of these individuals are ultimately allowed to enter the U.S. after being processed 
through an initial triage . . . .”); OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 30 (noting that from April 
1, 1997 to September 30, 1999, a monthly average of 601,000 individuals were sent to sec-
ondary inspection). 
 32. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 31; OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 30, at 
18-19. 
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The more extensive interview will sometimes be preceded by the hand-
cuffing of an applicant.  It will take place with only the questioner present, 
unless an interpreter is necessary, available, and called upon.  Three op-
tions are available to an inspector at the conclusion of the secondary inter-
view: admit the applicant, order the individual removed, or send the appli-
cant to a “credible fear” interview.33  The credible fear option is available 
only for potential asylum applicants.34  The removal option is likely for 
persons who do not possess proper travel documents35 or who carry docu-
ments that CBP officials suspect have been procured through fraud.36  A 
person ordered removed by a secondary inspector cannot appeal the order 
to a court;37 the only subsequent review will be conducted by the secondary 
inspector’s supervisor.38  If the supervisor approves the inspector’s order, 
removal will take place within days.39  All individuals who are removed are 
barred from reentering the United States for five years.40 
The third option—to neither admit nor deny entry, but instead to refer 
the applicant for a credible fear interview—is an appropriate choice when 
the applicant has indicated, during the secondary inspection interview, a 
fear of returning to his or her home country or an intent to apply for asy-
lum.41  In an effort to identify genuine asylum seekers during this process, 
immigration inspectors are required during secondary inspections to read 
aloud a statement that includes information about how “U.S. law provides 
protection to certain persons who face persecution, harm or torture upon 
return to their home country” and that any expressions of fear will be 
 
 33. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. § 1182(a)(7). 
 36. See id. § 1182(a)(6)(C). 
 37. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(C). 
 38. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (2010) (“[A]ny removal order entered by a [secondary 
inspector] must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate supervisor before the order is 
considered final. . . . The supervisory review shall include a review of the sworn statement 
and any answers and statements made by the alien regarding a fear of removal or return.”). 
 39. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) 
(2006); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GCD-98-81, ILLEGAL ALIENS: 
CHANGES IN THE PROCESS OF DENYING ALIENS ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES (1998) (indi-
cating that at most locations, at least ninety-five percent of the people deported via expe-
dited removal are removed on the day that they attempted to enter the United States or on 
the next day). 
 40. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) 
(2006). 
 41. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
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treated privately and confidentially.42  The officers are also required to ask 
each individual three questions designed to elicit information relevant to 
whether a credible fear referral is warranted.  The three “fear” questions 
are: 
“Why did you leave your home country or country of last residence?” 
“Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home 
country or being removed from the United States?” 
“Would you be harmed if you returned to your home country or country 
of last residence?”43 
A positive response to any of these three questions, or any other indica-
tion of fear, whether verbal or non-verbal, should warrant a referral of the 
applicant to a credible fear interview.  An asylum officer from CIS con-
ducts this interview, to determine whether the individual has a credible fear 
of persecution.44  The credible fear standard is a less demanding version of 
the requirements for establishing asylum.45 
Those who do not establish a credible fear of persecution to the satisfac-
tion of the CIS asylum officer are entitled to an extremely limited review of 
whether they meet the credible fear standard by an immigration judge.46  
Affirmation of the asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination 
will subject the applicant to removal, in most cases within a few days,47 
just as people denied admission by secondary inspectors are similarly re-
moved.  Those individuals who are found by an asylum officer to have a 
credible fear of persecution, on the other hand, are placed in removal pro-
ceedings in immigration court where they are eligible to apply for asylum 
as a defense to removal.48  Since IIRIRA took effect in 1997, most individ-
 
 42. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 31, at 252 (Form I-867A).  CBP training mate-
rials require all officers to use this form “in every case in which an alien is determined to be 
subject to Expedited Removal.” Id., at 13. 
 43. Id. at 253 (Form I-867B), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/ 
asylum_seekers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf.  CBP training materials require all officers to use this 
form “in every case in which an alien is determined to be subject to Expedited Removal.” 
Id. at 13.  Form I-867B also contains a fourth question: “Do you have any questions or is 
there anything else you would like to add.”  This fourth question is sometimes characterized 
as a “fear” question, but its intended scope—to make sure that the applicant understands the 
process—is broader. 
 44. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
(2006). 
 45. The term credible fear of persecution “means that there is a significant possibility, 
taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the 
alien’s claims and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish 
eligibility for asylum.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). 
 46. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). 
 47. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). 
 48. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
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uals subject to this process have been detained from the time of their sec-
ondary inspections interview to the final adjudication of their cases.49 
The REAL ID and the PATRIOT Acts, both enacted in the wake of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks in New York, Washington D.C., and Penn-
sylvania also have eroded asylum protection.  The PATRIOT Act bars asy-
lum protection to anyone who provided “material support” to terrorists, 
even if the applicant acted under duress or coercion.50  Thus, a “fisherman 
who after refusing to turn over his boat to guerillas, was abducted by them 
and forced to pay 50,000 rupees for his own ransom,” was barred from asy-
lum protection by an immigration judge, even though the judge recognized 
that the man acted under duress.51  The REAL ID Act authorizes triers of 
 
 49. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).  A recent internal DHS policy directive indicates an 
easing by the Obama administration of the strict interpretation of the detention mandate for 
those who establish a credible fear of persecution. See ICE Directive 11002.1, Parole of Ar-
riving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (DHS 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-parole_of_arriving_aliens_found_ 
credible_fear.pdf.  In particular, the policy provides that individuals who have been found to 
have a credible fear of persecution shall be interviewed for potential parole from detention.  
It states that  
when an arriving alien found to have a credible fear establishes to the satisfaction 
of [Detention and Removal personnel] his or her identity and that he or she 
presents neither a flight risk nor danger to the community, [the Detention and Re-
moval Office] should, absent additional factors . . . parole the alien on the basis 
that his or her continued detention is not in the public interest. 
Id. § 6.2.  The additional factors that may be considered are “serious adverse foreign policy 
consequences that may result if the alien is released or overriding law enforcement inter-
ests.” Id. § 8.3.  It remains to be seen whether this new policy results in a substantially more 
liberal parole practice; a predecessor program meant to encourage release, the Asylum Pre-
Screening Office Program (APSO), brought disappointing results, with wide discrepancies 
between INS offices and a parole rate generally much lower than had been expected. Pis-
tone, supra note 18, at 201-03, 239-43 (attributing the APSO program’s performance—
which fell “far short of expectations” and operated “inefficient[ly], inconsistent[ly] from 
district to district” and “unevenly around the country”—to the persistent bureaucratic biases 
of the INS’s enforcement culture). 
 50. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) 
(2006). 
 51.  Human Rights First, Brief Amicus Curiae of Human Rights First in support of Res-
pondent R-K-, In re R-K-, __ I. & N. Dec. __ (BIA Aug. 17, 2006), available at http://www. 
humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06926-asy-r-k-bia-ami-brief.pdf; see also Hearing on the Refugee 
Protection Act of 2010 Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., at 3 (May 19, 
2010) (written statement of the ACLU).  Human Rights First has noted that the exclusionary 
provisions of the PATRIOT Act are being applied to “minimal contributions, to people who 
were forced to pay ransom to armed groups, to doctors who provided medical care to the 
wounded in accordance with their medical obligations, and to persons who engaged in other 
forms of lawful activity.” Renewing America’s Commitment to the Refugee Convention: The 
Refugee Protection Act of 2010, Hearing on the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 Before the 
S. Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (May 19, 2010) (statement of Human Rights 
First), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/pdf/hrf-testimony-may-2010. 
pdf. 
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fact to require applicants to provide evidence to corroborate their otherwise 
credible testimony—a task which can be impossible when the events re-
counted took place in far away, isolated areas.52  In addition, the REAL ID 
Act authorizes adjudicators, in assessing the credibility of an asylum appli-
cant, to base their decisions on any inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or false-
hoods in the applicant’s testimony or other evidence, regardless of whether 
the inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood “goes to the heart of the appli-
cant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”53  Also, as to the legal standard 
to establish asylum eligibility, the REAL ID Act requires that, to establish 
persecution on account of one of the protected grounds, applicants for asy-
lum must prove that one of the five protected grounds was “at least one 
central reason for persecuting the applicant.”54 
II.  THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE RPA 
The erosion of asylum protection that has occurred over the past fifteen 
years would be partially reversed by the RPA.  In particular, the RPA 
would amend IIRIRA, the PATRIOT Act, and the REAL ID Act, as well as 
add to the law several other provisions that would have the likely effect of 
enhancing the rights of asylum seekers.55 
A. Changes to Provisions Introduced by IIRIRA 
The RPA would amend IIRIRA by eliminating the one year filing dead-
line imposed on all applications for asylum, and by changing, in four sig-
nificant ways, the expedited removal process as it is applied to asylum 
seekers.  The first change to the expedited removal system is that detention 
 
 52. For an insightful and thorough overview of how the REAL ID Act changes asylum 
law, see Marisa Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act is a 
False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101 (2006). 
 53. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) 
(2006). 
 54. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 55. In addition to the provisions discussed in this section, the RPA would make impor-
tant additional improvements to asylum and immigration law.  Among the most significant 
are: (1) the establishment of a secure alternative to detention, Refugee Protection Act of 
2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 9; (2) the promulgation of regulations governing minimally-
acceptable conditions of detention, id. § 10; (3) the authorization for the Attorney General to 
“appoint counsel to represent an alien if the fair resolution or effective adjudication of the 
proceedings would be served by appointment of counsel,” id. § 6; (4) the elimination of the 
one year waiting period for asylees to adjust to legal permanent residency, making them eli-
gible for Legal Permanent Resident status immediately upon a grant of asylum protection, 
id. § 14(b)(2)(C); and (5) the imposition of a bar on the removal of persons during the thirty-
day period that they have to file a Petition to Review their case with a federal circuit court, 
id. § 7(1). 
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after a credible fear interview would be discretionary, not mandatory under 
the RPA.56  Second, the RPA would for the first time authorize asylum of-
ficers to grant asylum to applicants who were processed through expedited 
removal and found to have a credible fear of persecution.57  Third, the RPA 
would mandate the use of professional language interpreters during all ex-
pedited removal interviews unless the interviewing officer or another “Fed-
eral Government employee” speaks the applicant’s language and is availa-
ble to interpret “effectively, accurately, and impartially.”58  Fourth, the 
RPA would require the CBP to record “the interview which served as a ba-
sis for” a sworn statement taken as part of the expedited removal process, 
including “a reading of the entire written statement to the alien in a lan-
guage that the alien claims to understand; and [either] [a] verbal affirmation 
by the alien of . . . the written statement” or a corrected version of the writ-
ten statement.59 
B. Changes to Provisions Introduced by the PATRIOT Act 
The RPA would amend the PATRIOT Act so that individuals who are 
forced to provide support to terrorist groups under duress would not auto-
matically be barred from asylum protection.  The RPA recognizes that asy-
lum seekers may be forcibly coerced into providing support to terrorists, 
and that such coerced cooperation does not mean that asylum seekers sup-
port or believe in the terrorists’ objectives—and hence that mere support 
should not necessarily be sufficient to bar protection.  Thus, the RPA 
would exempt individuals from the material support bar if they can prove 
that their actions were motivated by knowledge of “serious harm, including 
restraint against any person, or any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to 
cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in se-
rious harm to, or restraint against, any person.”60  Similarly, the RPA 
would exempt from the “persecutor of others” bar those who acted as a re-
sult of coercion.61 
 
 56. Id. § 8(a). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. § 12(d). 
 59. Id. § 12(b). 
 60. Id. § 4.  This provision would also repeal the so-called Tier III terrorist group defini-
tion.  This definition, originally introduced by the PATRIOT Act, includes as a terrorist 
group any “group of two or more persons, whether organized or not, that engages in terrorist 
activity” including all armed activity without any exception for de minimus activity. 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(G)(vi)(III) (2006). 
 61. Longstanding asylum law bars someone from asylum protection if the individual 
“ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opi-
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C. Changes to Provisions Introduced by the REAL ID Act 
Applicants for asylum must establish a connection between one of the 
five protected grounds for asylum and the motivation of the persecutor.  To 
establish that the persecution an applicant suffered or fears is “on account 
of” one of the protected grounds, the REAL ID Act required applicants for 
asylum to prove that one of the five protected grounds was “at least one 
central reason for persecuting the applicant.”62  The RPA lessens this re-
quirement, so that the “on account of” nexus requirement would be satis-
fied if one of the five grounds is “a factor in the applicant’s persecution or 
fear of persecution.”63 
Under other provisions introduced by the REAL ID Act, the trier of fact 
may deny an application for asylum if he or she finds any inconsistencies, 
inaccuracies, or falsehoods in any statements or evidence regardless of 
whether the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods “go [] to the heart 
of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”64  The RPA would 
amend this standard by giving an applicant the opportunity to “explain and 
to provide support or evidence to clarify” any inconsistencies or omissions 
that the trier of fact determines to exist.65 
Finally, under the REAL ID Act, the trier of fact can require corroborat-
ing evidence of an asylum applicant’s otherwise credible testimony without 
also providing notice or opportunity to supplement the record.66  The RPA 
would require triers of fact to “provide notice and allow the applicant a rea-
sonable opportunity to file such evidence[,] unless the applicant does not 
have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain” it.67 
 
nion.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).  The 
Supreme Court recently considered this provision and found that the lower court (in this 
case the BIA) erred in not considering whether the “persecutor of others” bar contained an 
exception for those who acted under duress or were coerced to act, remanding the case back 
to the lower court. See generally Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).  The RPA 
would clarify the statutory language by exempting those who acted as a result of coercion 
from the persecutor of others bar. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5. 
 62. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) 
(2006). 
 63. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5. 
 64. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) 
(2006). 
 65. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5. 
 66. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) 
(2006); see, e.g., Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
failure to warn an alien that she must produce corroborative evidence of her identity before 
issuing an adverse ruling does not violate the alien’s due process rights in asylum proceed-
ing). 
 67. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5. 
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D. Other Provisions 
In addition to restoring protections that have been eroded by Congress 
over the last fifteen years, some of the changes that the RPA proposes 
would add clarity to the most elusive of the five enumerated grounds for 
protection: “membership in a particular social group.”68  The issue of what 
constitutes membership in a particular social group has long been one of 
the most unsettled areas of asylum law.  The unsettled nature of this pro-
tected category has adversely impacted many persons, but perhaps most of 
all those fleeing gender based persecution, such as female genital mutila-
tion, “honor” crimes, domestic violence, rape, human trafficking, forced 
marriage, and crimes directed at the LGBT community.  Unlike persecution 
on account of the other four protected categories—race, religion, nationali-
ty, and political opinion—gender based human rights abuses usually are not 
committed by government actors in public places.  Rather the abuses are 
committed more often in the privacy of the home by private actors, such as 
family members, and are tolerated by the government as belonging to the 
private realm, thus leaving the victims without effective recourse in their 
home countries.69 
Two provisions of the RPA would address the uncertainty in the subs-
tantive law surrounding gender based social group claims.  First, the RPA 
would codify the definition of social group provided by the BIA’s decision 
in In re Acosta.70  In particular, the RPA would amend the INA to read: 
“any group whose members share a characteristic that is either immutable 
or fundamental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the person’s hu-
man rights such that the person should not be required to change it, shall be 
deemed a particular social group, without any additional requirement.”71  
This definition of social group would provide clarity to the law surrounding 
gender based claims and eliminate a judicially-imposed requirement that 
social groups be “socially visibile.”72  As Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge Richard Posner has recognized, in opposition to the requirement of 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping Ideas: A Critical Review of United 
States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 28 (1998) (noting that violence against women is ignored by law enforce-
ment authorities in many countries because it is seen as a domestic matter not warranting 
public attention); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of 
Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 137-39 (2007) 
(noting that less than ten percent of the femicides in Guatemala have been investigated with 
as many as one-third thought to be the result of domestic violence). 
 70. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985). 
 71. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5. 
 72. See In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (BIA 2008). 
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social visibility, members of a persecuted social group often go to great 
lengths to remain socially invisible.73  The RPA also would provide that the 
“on account of” nexus—i.e., evidence of the persecutor’s motive—can be 
established when the applicant offers either “[d]irect or circumstantial evi-
dence, including evidence that the State is unable to protect the applicant or 
that State legal or social norms tolerate such persecution against persons 
like the applicant.”74 
Finally, the RPA would authorize the United States Commission on In-
ternational Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which released an extensive 
study on expedited removal in 2005,75 to study again the expedited removal 
process.  In particular, the RPA would task USCIRF with determining 
whether and to what extent immigration officers: (a) improperly encourage 
asylum seekers “to withdraw or retract claims for asylum;” (b) incorrectly 
fail to refer asylum seekers for credible fear interviews; (c) incorrectly re-
move asylum seekers to countries in which they may be persecuted; and (d) 
detain asylum seekers “improperly or under inappropriate conditions.”76 
III.  WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE, BEYOND THE RPA 
One can hack at the branches of injustice, or one can strike at the roots.  
The RPA demonstrates a decided preference for the former course of ac-
tion.  The results are commendable, but limited in some respects; for ex-
ample, some of the changes would apply in a distinct minority of cases,77 
while others are likely to most benefit the minority of asylum applicants 
fortunate enough to be represented by counsel.78  Concededly, the RPA’s 
bold and welcome call for the elimination of the one-year deadline for fil-
ing an asylum claim would constitute a major change of wide applicability, 
and might fairly be considered striking at (or at least very near to) the roots 
of injustice.79  But that call—and I mean this as description rather than as 
criticism—is distinctly unrepresentative of the legislation as a whole. 
 
 73. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the “social 
visibility” criterion). 
 74. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5. 
 75. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 30; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 31. 
 76. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 13. 
 77. E.g., id. § 4 (concerning a bar on asylum for those persons who have provided ma-
terial support to terrorists). 
 78. E.g., id. § 5 (amending the notoriously difficult to apply definition of “social 
group”). 
 79. See Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration 
of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684231 (finding that fifty-nine 
percent of the applicants who filed for asylum more than one year after arriving in the Unit-
PISTONE_CHRISTENSEN 1/11/2011  11:03 AM 
262 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
More typical are some of the changes concerning expedited removal.  
For many persons, the expedited removal process replaced a much leng-
thier and more considered deportation process that historically had been 
performed by immigration judges in court proceedings.  During these court 
proceedings, applicants facing removal were granted numerous rights de-
signed to increase the accuracy of decision-making, including the rights to 
offer evidence and witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses, to be represented 
by counsel (at no expense to the government),80 and to appeal adverse deci-
sions to administrative courts81 and federal circuit courts.82  Under expe-
dited removal these rights were approximated rather than duplicated be-
cause duplication of the court proceedings and all its concomitant rights 
would destroy the distinct essence of the expedited removal process, i.e., its 
speed.83  Thus, for example, rather than have the right to a lawyer and the 
lawyer’s knowledge of the law, the expedited removal process allows for 
the reading of a short statement describing asylum protection.84  And in-
stead of a broad right to present witnesses and develop evidence, the expe-
dited removal process allows applicants “to offer their own statements and 
whatever documentary evidence they happen[] to be carrying with them.”85 
 
ed States were denied asylum protection by the DHS); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM 
FILING DEADLINE: DENYING PROTECTION TO THE PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERN-
MENT EFFICIENCY (Sept. 2010), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/afd.pdf. 
 80. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2006). 
 81. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2010). 
 82. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
 83. For an insightful discussion on the history of the development of the expedited re-
moval statutory provisions and implementing regulations, see PHILIP SCHRAG, A WELL-
FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 193-
224 (2000). 
 84. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 31, at 13. 
 85. Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to be Broken: How the 
Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 169 (2006).  
During the drafting of the regulations implementing expedited removal, efforts also were 
made to replace, to some extent, other rights traditionally granted during immigration hear-
ings.  For example: 
[I]n place of giving the applicant or his or her lawyer time to develop the record, 
as well as the benefit of clarifying questions that were frequently posed by judges 
in deportation proceedings, immigration inspectors would be required to ask and 
record answers to three specific questions designed to elicit evidence of a possible 
claim for asylum.  [Also], in place of a verified record established by court report-
ers or audiotaping, upon the completion of the interview, immigration inspectors 
would have the applicant read and sign the inspector’s record of the meeting.  Fi-
nally, instead of a right to appeal adverse decisions to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals and the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, the 
regulations provided for a single review by a second-line supervisor. 
Id. 
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Two of the RPA’s changes to the expedited removal process are in this 
vein: (1) the requirement that immigration officers use a professional lan-
guage interpreter during secondary inspection interviews when no “Federal 
Government employee [is] available . . . to interpret effectively, accurately, 
and impartially,”86 and (2) that CBP officers record their interviews, in-
cluding both the reading of the sworn statement to the applicant and the ap-
plicant’s affirmation of its contents.87  Both of these changes would mimic 
protections available as a matter of course in hearings before immigration 
judges, which are in one form or another always recorded and during which 
professional interpreters are almost always used.88  These two provisions of 
the RPA should improve the accuracy of fact-finding during the expedited 
removal process,89 and are otherwise appropriate reforms, which should 
 
 86. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 12(d).  To some extent, this 
provision merely tracks an existing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2010), which re-
quires that interpretive assistance be used, if necessary, at secondary inspection. See gener-
ally Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Un-
fair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 1, 54-58 (2001) (discussing the regulation requiring interpretive 
assistance, and suggesting problems with the regulation and improvements that might be 
made to it).  Nonetheless, as several studies have confirmed that that regulation is some-
times ignored, see Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 85, at 184 & nn. 82-83, it would be help-
ful to have Congress re-affirm the importance of utilizing interpreters.  The main additional 
importance of the RPA provision stems from its limitation of appropriate interpreters to pro-
fessional interpreters and Federal Government employees.  Among other things, this limita-
tion represents a worthy attempt to cure CBP’s heavy reliance on airline employees for in-
terpretive assistance.  Those employees, although fluent in a required language, may be 
biased and likely will be untrained in proper techniques of interpretation, e.g., untrained in-
terpreters often summarize rather than interpret and may attempt to resolve ambiguities on 
their own instead of through additional questioning. See id., at 184. 
 87. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 12(b).  For an early argu-
ment that secondary inspections interviews should be recorded, see Pistone & Hoeffner, su-
pra note 85, at 169. 
 88. I have litigated asylum cases before immigration judges for twenty years, and in on-
ly one of those cases was a non-professional interpreter used. 
 89. Recording and professional interpretation will be especially useful to those persons 
who are not removed after the secondary inspection.  Currently, the sworn statement pro-
vides the main record of what occurred at the secondary inspections interview and, accor-
dingly, it is relied upon by adjudicators at later stages of the process.  However, as the US-
CIRF study found, “sworn statements taken by officers are not verbatim, are not verifiable, 
often indicate that information was conveyed to the asylum seeker which was never, in fact, 
conveyed, and sometimes contain questions that were never asked.  Sworn statements look 
like verbatim transcripts but are not.” U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EXPE-
DITED REMOVAL STUDY REPORT CARD: 2 YEARS LATER, at 4 (2007) [hereinafter USCIRF RE-
PORT CARD].  A recording of the interview, thus, will provide the verbatim record that is 
now lacking, and stand as a corrective to both deliberate and inadvertent error, including 
mistakes of interpretation. See also infra note 131 and accompanying text (noting how re-
cording of interviews could be used in conjunction with “testers” to identify problem em-
ployees). 
PISTONE_CHRISTENSEN 1/11/2011  11:03 AM 
264 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
find wide acceptance among lawmakers, because they would add needed 
protections to the process without imposing on its expedited character.90 
This assessment assumes, of course, that the rules established by legisla-
tion or regulation can be expected to be followed.  Sadly, prior government 
reports,91 as well as reports by outside organizations,92 indicate that this as-
sumption is often unwarranted.  USCIRF’s 2005 report on expedited re-
moval, for instance, states that even when they knew that they were being 
monitored by USCIRF representatives, “[i]n approximately half of inspec-
tions observed, [CBP] inspectors failed to inform the alien”—as the law re-
quires—that “(s)he may ask for protection if (s)he has a fear of returning 
home.”93  The true failure rate, the report indicated, was very likely even 
higher, given the commonsense assumption that “inappropriate behaviors 
[by inspectors] would be fewer when observers were monitoring their in-
terviews.”94  The same report indicates that, according to CBP files, up to 
fifteen percent of the time there was a failure to ask or record the answer to 
one of the three mandated “fear” questions earlier noted.95  Moreover, the 
files underestimate, perhaps by a significant amount, the rate of noncom-
pliance—the USCIRF “researchers found that the file often indicated that 
all . . . fear questions were asked of the alien, even when they were not.”96  
Perhaps worst of all, constituting a clear violation of the treaty obligation of 
non-refoulement97 as well as DHS regulations,98 both USCIRF and GAO 
reports have found that even individuals who expressed fear were some-
times returned without any hearing via expedited removal;99 indeed, US-
 
 90. While the use of professional language interpreters can add to the length of an inter-
view because each statement has to be spoken twice, interpreters also can speed up the 
process, as they can eliminate the confused back and forth that occurs between people who 
cannot easily understand each other.  In all events, the accuracy that is gained through com-
petent interpretation should offset concerns about de minimus additions to the length of the 
expedited removal process. 
 91. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 30, at 50-62; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra 
note 31, at 91; OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 30. 
 92. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IS THIS AMERICA? THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO 
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN AMERICA (2000). 
 93. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 30, at 6. 
 94. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 31, at 30. 
 95. Id. at 14-16 (indicating, at Table 2.1, that a review of CBP files found a 95% com-
pliance rate for each question, meaning that a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 15% of 
the time at least one fear question was left unasked or unanswered). 
 96. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 30, at 55 (the quoted material actually refers to 
“all four fear questions”; see supra note 43, for an explanation as to why I have referred to 
“three” fear questions). 
 97. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 85, at 180. 
 98. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2010). 
 99. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 85, at 179. 
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CIRF’s report showed that “in nearly 15 percent of the cases [observed by 
USCIRF representatives], asylum seekers who expressed a fear of return 
were nevertheless removed without a referral to an Asylum Officer.”100  
And, distressingly, but not surprisingly, the same GAO and USCIRF re-
ports also have shown that the compliance of CBP supervisors with regula-
tions often has been no better.101 
Accordingly, although the RPA’s proposed changes to the expedited re-
moval process represent apparent improvements in the law, past practice 
suggests that—due to agency noncompliance—the theoretical effects of the 
changes are likely to far exceed the actual effects.  The causes of noncom-
pliance are varied, but the main problem is a dominant enforcement culture 
that emphasizes and rewards restricting entry into the United States over 
possible competing goals, such as maximizing legal immigration.102  In 
such an environment, changes in the rules may not change on-the-ground 
practices.  Legislators need to be aware of this and, in the case of DHS and 
its component agency, CBP, attempt to counteract the enforcement bias. 
The RPA provides one mechanism for doing so, in its authorization of 
another study of expedited removal by USCIRF.103  As a co-author and I 
noted in an earlier article, “to the extent that they uncover excesses of an 
enforcement culture, external studies can act as a type of counterforce” 
which, inside as well as outside of an agency, can “attract allies and disarm 
opponents of reform.”104  In the case of expedited removal and the CBP, it 
is crucial that such a counterforce be applied for—as we have seen—when 
that counterforce is lacking, even the clearest and most vital protections are 
at risk of being ignored.  In this sense, the RPA’s authorization of another 
USCIRF study is the most important provision in the entire Act; done cor-
rectly—an important caveat, as we shall see—such a study truly does pro-
vide for the possibility of striking at the roots of injustice by making it less 
likely that the many different injustices that flow from CBP’s repeated and 
widespread violations of established protections will continue unabated. 
Indeed, the case for utilizing outside studies to counterbalance the ef-
fects of the dominant enforcement culture of CBP on its administration of 
the expedited removal process could hardly be stronger.  First, by design, 
expedited removal otherwise lacks oversight of almost any kind.  It takes 
place out of public view, typically involving unreviewable decisions by on-
ly two persons—a lone CBP inspector and his or her supervisor—in a 
 
 100. USCIRF REPORT CARD, supra note 89, at 4. 
 101. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 85, at 184-93 (detailing supervisory failures). 
 102.  Id. at 198-200. 
 103. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 13. 
 104. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 85, at 200. 
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process “opaque not only to the outside world, but even within the 
[DHS].”105  Given that the cost of mistakenly removing a genuine asylum 
seeker can be torture or death, the moments of transparency represented by 
the occasional outside report can hardly be considered an overreaction to 
minor difficulties or evidence of a bent toward micromanagement.  Rather, 
to the contrary, the nature of the process and the possible deadly conse-
quences of error make the occasional outside assessment a moral, if not a 
legal, necessity. 
Second, as noted previously, prior studies have found serious problems 
with the administration of expedited removal.106  Indeed, a conservative 
extrapolation from these studies suggests that—as of 2006—
“approximately 20,000 genuine asylum seekers ha[d] been refused entry by 
the United States” solely due to CBP’s disregard of established regula-
tions.107  Further, there is no evidence that matters have improved since 
2006.  In fact, USCIRF’s 2005 recommendations to CBP appear to have 
been completely ignored; rating CBP’s implementation of those recom-
mendations, a 2007 “Report Card” from USCIRF gave CBP an “F” in 
every category.108  All other things remaining the same, then, with the addi-
tional passage of time since 2006, it is likely that 30,000 genuine asylum 
seekers have now been improperly denied entry into the United States due 
to the neglect and misfeasance of the CBP.  The extent of the continuing 
problem and CBP’s evident intransigence suggests that outside reviews 
conducted at more than an occasional rate are a practical necessity.  Under 
a system guided by the rule of law, an agency’s determination to let bad 
news “blow over,” so that it can continue to ignore established regulations, 
 
 105. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 30, at 76. 
 106. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
 107. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 85, at 193-96.  The estimate is a conservative one 
because it does not include as part of the calculation any deportations of genuine asylum 
seekers caused by the following demonstrated violations of the rules governing expedited 
removal: 
(1) the inappropriate exertion of pressure on asylum seekers to withdraw their ap-
plications for admission; (2) the failure to use interpreters or the use of inadequate 
or inappropriate interpreters; (3) the conditions at secondary inspection, which are 
not conducive to full disclosure (e.g., the handcuffing and shackling of asylum 
seekers); (4) the reliance by judges on inaccurate or incomplete sworn statements 
as the basis for making adverse credibility findings and denying asylum protec-
tion; (5) the “push-back” of asylum seekers at primary inspection; (6) the failure 
of appropriate or sometimes any supervisors to review expedited removal orders 
and I-867s; and (7) mistakes made because of inadequate telephonic review of I-
867 forms by supervisors. 
Id. at 193-94 (footnotes omitted). 
 108. USCIRF REPORT CARD, supra note 89, at 4. 
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cannot be allowed to succeed, especially when the cost is as high as it is 
here. 
Finally—and this is the third reason that the case for authorizing addi-
tional outside studies of expedited removal is especially strong—the threat 
expedited removal poses to genuine asylum seekers and others has grown 
as the use of expedited removal has expanded over the years.  From its in-
ception in 1997 until November 2002, expedited removal was used only for 
individuals arriving in the United States at ports of entry.  However, IIRI-
RA actually authorized a more extensive power: the use of expedited re-
moval in the interior of the country for individuals who have not been for-
mally admitted or paroled into the United States and who cannot 
affirmatively show that they have been physically present in the United 
States continuously for two years.109  The authority to expand the expedited 
removal power to these limits originally was placed in the “sole and unre-
viewable discretion of the Attorney General” and now rests with the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security.110  The Bush administration utilized a portion 
of this authority in November 2002 to expand expedited removal to non-
Cuban migrants arriving by sea who had not been admitted or paroled into 
the United States.111  In August 2004, the expedited removal power was 
expanded again to cover individuals who are encountered by an immigra-
tion officer within 100 miles of certain designated parts of the land borders 
with Mexico and Canada and who cannot establish to the “satisfaction of 
an immigration officer that they have been physically present in the United 
States continuously for the fourteen-day (14-day) period immediately prior 
the date of encounter.”112  One year later, expedited removal was expanded 
 
 109. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) 
(2006).  The burden lies with the apprehended individual to affirmatively prove the required 
continual presence. 8 C.F.R. § 235(b)(1)(ii) (2010). 
 110. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (2006).  Indeed, the regulations provide that the Secretary’s 
designation shall become effective upon publication of a notice in the Federal 
Register.  However, if the [Secretary] determines, in the exercise of discretion, 
that the delay caused by publication would adversely affect the interests of the 
United States or the effective enforcement of the immigration laws, the [Secre-
tary]’s designation shall become effective immediately upon issuance, and shall 
be published in the Federal Register as soon as practicable thereafter. 
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii) (2010). 
 111. See Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924 (Nov. 13, 
2002). 
 112. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-81 (Aug. 11, 2004) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii) (2010)); see also Shoba Sivaprasad Whadia, The 
Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 391 (2007) 
(discussing expansion of expedited removal). 
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to the entire southern border.113  A year later, in 2006, the fourth expansion 
of the expedited removal power extended its application to the entire U.S.-
Canadian border and to all U.S. coastal areas.114  Recently, calls have been 
made to extend expedited removal one more time, into the interior of the 
country, and apply it to the full extent permitted by law.115  As a conse-
quence of these expansions, expedited removal is now more likely to be 
applied in a more dispersed range of locations, to a greater number of 
people, and by inspectors with less experience and less training. 
In sum, expedited removal is a process that by its nature is prone to 
abuse, by its record is likely to be abused, and by the combination of its ex-
pansion and CBP intransigence is likely to be abused to a greater extent in 
the years ahead.  Indeed, recent events suggest that U.S. citizens and legal 
residents are now at a greatly heightened risk of being pulled into the 
process.  For example, border patrol officers are now entering trains and 
buses traveling between Chicago and New York and asking everyone on 
board about their citizenship status.116  The expansions of the expedited 
removal power are the apparent sources of authority for these stops; consis-
tent with the 2004 and 2006 expansions, border patrol agents consider the 
stops legal if they take place within one-hundred miles from an internation-
al land border or within one-hundred miles from international waters.117  
As a result of the stops, legal residents are being “questioned and jailed, of-
ten because the patrol did not recognize their legal status.”118  Indeed, it 
takes little imagination to understand that the favored targets of these stops 
will be persons, even citizens, whose accents suggest birth outside the 
United States.119  The practice has been called “coercive, unconstitutional 
 
 113. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Expands Expedited Remov-
al Authority Along Southwest Border (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhs 
public/display?content=4816]. 
 114. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Streamlines Removal 
Process Along Entire U.S. Border (Jan. 30, 2006) (on file with the author). 
 115. ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33109, IMMI-
GRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS, Summary Page (2005). 
 116. Nina Bernstein, Border Sweeps in North Reach Miles Into U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
29, 2010, at A1. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. This is true despite the cautionary tale of Sharon McKnight, a mentally disabled 
woman who, despite her U.S. birth and citizenship, speaks with a Jamaican accent.  Al-
though McKnight produced a valid U.S. passport for immigration agents at John F. Kennedy 
International Airport after arriving on a flight from Jamaica, she was deported to that coun-
try the next day via the expedited removal process. See John Moreno Gonzales, McKnight 
Comes Home: INS Officials Apologize for Blunder, NEWSDAY, June 19, 2000, at A7.  
McKnight’s story also highlights that the mentally disabled, who often are capable of travel-
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and tainted by racial profiling”;120 it essentially replicates the dangers of 
the recent and controversial Arizona statute directed at undocumented im-
migrants, except that it is even without the safeguards built into that sta-
tute.121  Should calls for further expansion of expedited removal be heeded, 
law enforcement activities of this kind might be expected everywhere in the 
country because that is where CBP’s jurisdiction would reach.  As it is, 
however, two-thirds of the U.S. population already is within reach of the 
expanded expedited removal authority. 
The post-9/11 expansions of the reach of expedited removal are an un-
fortunate trend; we should be moving in precisely the opposite direction.  
Perhaps it is a bow to political reality, but the absence of any provision in 
the recently proposed RPA to cut back on expedited removal provides a vi-
vid contrast to a predecessor Refugee Protection Act,122 introduced in the 
Senate in 1999, that would have “limit[ed] the use of expedited removal to 
times of immigration emergencies.”123  I quibbled with the statutory lan-
guage of the earlier Refugee Protection Act, considering it too open to ma-
nipulation by an unsympathetic executive branch,124 but it surely would 
have kept expedited removal away from the train stations of Chicago and 
the bus stations of Rochester, New York.  Whatever the merits of the new 
RPA—and there are many—it is to the 1999 version that we must look for 
a properly scaled back conception of expedited removal’s appropriate role.  
But even limiting expedited removal to ports of entry, as well as true im-
migration emergencies, would be a vast improvement over the current re-
ality, which has seen expedited removal spread like kudzu across the land.  
Future Congresses must take care to ensure that this expansion does not 
mar permanently the legal landscape.  As I sit writing these words on the 
ninth anniversary of 9/11, however, I acknowledge that it may take a few 
 
ing alone on public transportation, are likely to be disproportionately affected as expedited 
removal moves from airports to train and bus stations. 
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more years, and the exposure of a few more outrageous deportations, be-
fore that argument will prevail. 
In all events, the only tenable argument against subjecting to additional 
scrutiny a process that is, in several senses, so far-reaching is the resigned 
conclusion that resistance is futile—what, for example, did USCIRF’s de-
vastating 2005 report achieve?  USCIRF has admitted, in fact, that CBP es-
sentially ignored that report.125  The appropriate response, I think, is not 
that the dominant enforcement culture makes change impossible, but rather 
that isolated and limited reports are likely to be ineffective in producing 
change.  Congress should ensure, therefore, that future reports do not suffer 
from or at least minimize these shortcomings.  The provision of the RPA 
authorizing a report by USCIRF could achieve this objective if it included 
the following four requirements. 
First, Congress should not be content with authorizing one or even two 
studies at a time, but instead should approve a longer series of comprehen-
sive studies.  The leadership of DHS and CBP must be made to understand 
that there will be no relief from outside review until substantial improve-
ment is shown in complying with established policies. 
Second, USCIRF’s 2005 report was “the first systematic evaluation of 
the Expedited Removal process utilizing direct observation of Secondary 
Inspection interviews with arriving aliens.”126  GAO’s 2000 report, in con-
trast, was based mainly on an examination of paper case files.127  Even so, 
however, USCIRF’s study still was limited by, for example, CBP’s prohibi-
tion on interviews with front-line CBP officers.128  In authorizing a new re-
port, Congress expressly should lift this prohibition.  Indeed, Congress 
should consider authorizing each subsequent report to be increasingly in-
trusive, again with the idea of demonstrating that there will be no let up in 
scrutiny until substantial improvement is shown.129 
Third, as noted, CBP ignored USCIRF’s 2005 study.  Indeed, as US-
CIRF pointedly stated in its 2007 “Report Card,” CBP appears not only to 
 
 125. USCIRF REPORT CARD, supra note 89. 
 126. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 31, at 28. 
 127. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 30, at 4-5. 
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have made no changes in response to the 2005 report, neither it nor DHS 
even deemed it necessary to respond at all to USCIRF’s post-report re-
quests for information.130  Congress must demonstrate that it will not per-
mit such blatant disregard of a report it authorized; it should order DHS to 
respond formally and completely to all subsequent reports. 
Finally, as a tool in service of the studies of expedited removal and to 
monitor and measure the implementation of recommended changes in be-
tween study periods, testers should be authorized by Congress for use by 
both CBP and whatever body undertakes an authorized study.  Under vari-
ous scenarios, the testers would pose as international travelers.  Among the 
many benefits of testers,131 their use could maximize the benefits of the 
RPA’s proposed recording of interviews.  One problem with universal re-
cording (in general, a very good idea) is that the sheer volume of informa-
tion makes identifying what is notable and what is not extremely difficult 
and inefficient.  Based on their personal experiences, testers would be able 
to point supervisors, researchers, and investigators in the right direction, to 
individuals and offices that may be inclined to skirt the rules. 
A series of studies conducted along these lines is far more likely than a 
single study to move a reluctant bureaucracy to do what it should, but too 
often does not: follow the law.  The most recalcitrant agency will respond, 
eventually, when the ignoring of calls for change brings more trouble and 
disruption than change itself would.  The RPA should therefore itself be 
amended so that the studies authorized by it can achieve the dual purposes 
of shedding light on the reality of expedited removal and moving CBP to 
respond to and try to remedy noted deficiencies.  We have seen that con-
ceiving studies only in terms of the first objective dooms them to practical 
irrelevance; CBP’s enforcement culture is too strong.  Insanity, they say, is 
doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.  Con-
gress should make sure that the next series of studies are different enough 
from past studies to bring about a different and more positive result.  It is 
no easy task to work against a strong bureaucratic culture, but proceeding 
as if such a culture did not exist assures failure.  In sum, done correctly, 
congressionally-authorized studies could hack at the roots of the injustices 
of the expedited removal process, but the single study authorized by the 
RPA is likely to fall short of achieving this ambitious and very desirable 
result. 
 
 130. USCIRF REPORT CARD, supra note 89. 
 131. See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 85, at 202-03 (listing additional benefits of tes-
ters). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Refugee Protection Act would improve the asylum system in nu-
merous ways.  It should be adopted by Congress.  Even assuming passage 
of the RPA, however, great challenges will remain, particularly with regard 
to expedited removal.  That system still will be likely to reject legitimate 
asylum seekers at an alarming rate; moreover, the continued expansion of 
expedited removal has made it likely that matters will get worse—even to 
the point of endangering the freedoms of American citizens—before they 
get better.  At the very least, future Congresses must rein in the post-9/11 
expansions of expedited removal and, in the absence of a sudden onset 
mass influx emergency, limit expedited removal’s applicability to persons 
newly-arrived at ports of entry.  The temptation to expand the system of 
expedited removal to its statutory limits has proven too difficult to resist, as 
what was originally conceived as an exception to usual practice now threat-
ens to become too much the rule. 
While we wait for that opportune moment when a reversal of the past 
decade’s expansions of expedited removal might become possible, the most 
pressing immediate challenge is to ensure that the expedited removal 
process at least provides in fact the individual protections promised by the 
applicable statutes and regulations.  Utilizing outside investigators to con-
duct studies of the process is an appropriate and, given the particular cha-
racteristics of the CBP’s bureaucratic culture, perhaps the best method to 
achieve this end.  The RPA’s authorization of a new study by USCIRF is 
therefore a good first step in the right direction.  As this Article has argued, 
however, outside studies are unlikely to have a substantial impact unless 
they occur with more regularity and are less restricted than the studies that 
have been undertaken heretofore. 
 
